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Placer Mining Law as administered in the district of Alaska
may properly invite special though brief consideration in the
course of general study of the law of mining upon the public
lands of the United States. Some peculiar conditions there obtain-
ing have presented to the courts new problems for solution,
or have called for new applications of familiar principles; and
that judicial field, embracing probably the largest and richest area
of placer deposits on the globe, finds itself furnished with a more
scanty equipment of written law touching the acquisition of pos-
sessory rights in mineral lands than any one of the mining states
and territories in our contiguous continental area. To this lack of
statutory regulation of the subject matter is largely due, as we
shall see, the excessive litigation over titles to mining claims,
which has made the uncertainty of Alaskan investments a re-
proach and has operated as a serious drag upon the energy of its
mining enterprise. Hence, this discussion of the subject must
inevitably take on, to some extent, the aspect of a criticism of
the non-action of Congress.
The proceedings to obtain patents of mineral lands from the
government call for no separate treatment, either as regards
Alaska or as regards placer ground in con.-adistinction to lode
deposits. This is so, not only because the formal steps toward
obtaining a mineral patent all follow one beaten track, with what-
ever region or whatever class of mineral deposits they are con-
cerned, but because the mining interests of Alaska have little to
do, thus far, with patented titles. Not one per cent of the located
claims have as yet been made the basis of applications for patents;
probably at least ninety per cent of the profitable ground will
eventually be worked out without ever being divested of govern-
ment title.2 We have here to do, then, only with the possessory
estate in unpatented mining claims, and the legal incidents at-
tendant on its acquisition and enjoyment.
Consider for a moment the basis of the estate, and the acts by
force of which it vests. The government of the United States
more than sixty years ago abandoned all idea of insisting upon
1 Lecture delivered to the graduate class of the Yale Law School,
March 4, i9og. By Thomas R. Shepard, of the Bar of Nome, Alaska.
2 See 37 L. D. (1908), pp. 257-8.
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regalian rights in the mineral wealth of its domain, even in the
precious metals, and contented itself with a policy of reservation
from sale of its mineral lands ;3 and, after submitting perforce to
the occupation and enjoyment, by each firstcomer, of the gold
fields of the Pacific slope for some eighteen years following the
discovery of their wealth, during which period the miners crudely
organized themselves under local -rules which acquired the force
of customary law, the government finally, in I866, by statute
recognized and confirmed the rights which its acquiescence had
given rise to, and extended to the discoverer and occupier of
mineral land the right to purchase it and receive a patent of
ownership in fee.4 But the government did more. It threw its
mineral lands open not only to purchase by the discoverer and
occupier, but to the discoverer's occupation without purchase; the
Act of 1866, confined to lode deposits, being first extended by an
amendatory Act of i87o 5 to embrace placer ground, and then re-
placed in 1872 by the substantially equivalent statute still in force,
which declares that:
"All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United
States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be
free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the
United States," etc.8
Observe the phraseology of this broad grant: "The lands in
which they are found"-there is the requirement of discovery of
valuable mineral, to differentiate such lands from the general
public domain and bring them within the scope of the grant. "To
occupation and purchase"--there are the privileges conferred, the
extent of the grant. Its two components--occupation, and pur-
chase-are specified conjunctively, and the later sections pro-
vide the machinery of purchase and fix the price; yet there is no
requirement that he who, having discovered mineral, may occupy
the land (which, as construed, means enjoy to the uttermost-
SAct of Congress Sept. 4, 184I, Ch. 16. § io; 5 U. S. Stats, at
Large, p. 453. Act of July 4, x866, Ch. 166, § 5; 14 Stats., p. 86; U. S.
R. S. § 2318. I Lindley on Mines (2nd Ed, 1903), §§ 33-36. Shamel
on Mining, Mineral and Geological Law (907), p. 24. See Shoemaker v.
United States (1893), 147 U. S. 282; 37 L. Ed. 170, 171.
4 Act of July 26, i866, Ch. 262, § I; r4 Stat. L., p. 251. Jennison
v. Kirk (1879), 98 U. S. 453; 25 L. Ed. 240, 242. Broder v. Natoma W. &
M. Co. (870), 101 U. S. 274; 25 L. Ed. 790. 791.
5Act of July 9, 187o, Ch. 235. § i; x6 Stat. L., p. 217; R. S. § 2329.
s Act of May io, 1872, Ch. 152, § I; 17 Stat. L., p. 91; R. S. § 23T9.
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work out, and render valueless)' must also purchase it." And by
a long line of decisions it is established that purchase cannot be
compelled, that the permission to occupy, when acted upon,
creates a vested possessory estate-not a mere revocable license,
but a transferable and inheritable interest in real estate which is
subject only to the "paramount title of the United States," and is
property.0  And the paramount title of the United States-re-
served until patent, which in most instances is never called for-
is a "barren ideality;" for the possessory estate being property,
it is protected by the Constitution from extinguishment without
compensation.' 0
Here, then,--putting aside the provision for purchase as with-
out significance, purchase being wholly optional with the grantee
of the right of possession,-is a grant certainly extraordinary in
its liberality. And it is a grant, like other statutory grants of the
public lands (the homestead act, the railroad aid acts, and so
on), uncertain in the first instance as to its subject matter, and
-which afterwards becomes definite and operative, and vests an
estate in a specific tract, by force solely of certain acts, in pais,
on the part of the grantee."'
Such a grant, to be guarded in any degree against fraudulent
and unmerited acquisition of its great benefits, must needs be
hedged about with careful provision for the actual and due per-
formance of those acts on the part of a would-be grantee which
are to vest in him the estate. And it was the aim of the law of
1872 to provide such safeguards. But that was done, first, by
7Forbes v. Gracey (1877), 94 U. S. 762; 24 L. Ed., 313, 314. Belk v.
Meagher (x88i), 104 U. S. 279; -26 L. Ed., 735, 737. Silver Bow M. & M.
Co. v. Clark (1885), 5 Mont. 378, 414; 5 Pac. 570, 574. And see R. S.
§ 2322.
8 Gold Hill Q. M. Co. v. Ish (1873), 5 Or. 1o4, iog. Coleman v. Mc-
Kenzie, 29 L. D. 359. See commissioner's instructions to local land offices,
Zabriskie's Land Laws, p. 207.
0 Forbes v. Gracey, supra. Belk v. Meagher, supra. R. S. § go.
10 Gwillim v. Donnellan (1885), 115 U. S. 45, 50. Gold Hill Co. v.
Ish, supra. McFeters v. Pierson (89o), 15 Col. 201, 204; 24 Pac. 1O76,
1077; 22 Am. St. R. 383, 39o. Seymour v. Fisher (i89i), x6 Col. 188, 192*;
27 Pac. 24o, 241.
11 Ryan v. Carter (1876), 93 U. S. 78; 23 L. Ed. 807. 8o8. Heydenfeldt
v. Daney G. & S. M. Co. (1877), 93 U. S. 634; L. Ed. 995, 997. Tameling
v. U. S. Freehold &c., Co. (1877), 93 U. S. 644; 23 L. Ed. 998, OO3.
Gwillim v. Donnellan, supra. Manuel v. Wulff (1894), 152
U. S. 505; 38 L. Ed. 532, 534. Talbott v. King (1886), 6 Mont. 76, 99;
9 Pac. 434. 436.
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expressly laying down only two requirements ("discovery," as a
preliminary requisite, being presupposed), namely, that "the loca-
tion must be distinctly marked on the ground so that its bound-
aries can be readily traced," and that "all records of mining
claims hereafter made shall contain the name or names of the
locators, the date of the location, and such a description of the
claim or claims located, by reference to some natural object or
permanent monument, as will identify the claim ;" 12 and secondly,
by providing that, subject to these two skeleton requirements:
"The miners of each mining district may make regulations not
in conflict with the laws of the United States, or with the laws
of the state or territory in which the district is situated, governing
the location, manner of recording, and amount of work necessary
to hold possession of a mining claim." 12
The federal legislation, then, evidently contemplates that its
scanty outline of the acts needful to vest the possessory estate
granted and to apply the grant to a specific area shall be sup-
plemented and particularized, either by local state or territorial
legislation, or by more narrowly local district regulation, or by
both. And it is plain that only by such supplementary enactments
can the grant be safeguarded against uncertainty of operation,
and grave abuses. The federal law, which as has been said is a
grant to every citizen who chooses to accept it, a grant inchoate
and indefinite but presently to become complete and specific by
force of the citizen's own acts, does not call for the posting of any
notice at the point of discovery or within the limits claimed,1 3
or specify anything as to the posts or other monuments to be set
in marking the location on the ground, or fix the length of time
after discovery within which the acts of location shall be com-
pleted, or require that notice of location shall be anywhere
recorded.14 As to this last, it should be noted that the federal
statute does not in terms require that mining claims shall be re-
corded, but merely specifies what shall be contained in such
records of them (if any) as local authority may require.
12Act of May io, 1872, Ch. 152, § 5; 17 Stat. L., p. 92; R. S. § 2324.
S12Act of May io, 1872, Ch. 152, § 5; 17 Stat. L., p. 92; R. S. § 2324.
1 3 Haws v. Victoria Copper Co. (i895), i6o U. S. 303; 4o L. Ed. 436,
44i. Book v. Justi'e M. Co. (i893), 58 Fed. io6, 15.
24 Haws v. Copper Co., supra. Golden Fleece G. & S. M. Co. v.
Cable C. G. & S. M. Co. (1877), i2 Nev. 312, 323. North Noonday M.
Co. v. Orient M. Co. (i88o), i Fed. 522, 5M. Fuller v. Harris (1887) 29
Fed. (Alaska) 814, 818. Meydenbauer v. Stevens (1897), 78 Fed. (Alaska)
787, 792. Thomson v. Allen (i9o2), i Alaska, 636, 639.
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All these omitted details, as well as others, are of importance.
Rules prescribing them (or at least some of them), and con-
formity to such rules, are essential to the definiteness and cer-
tainty of mining rights and to the defeat and discouragement of
groundless litigation, often instituted with blackmail as its motive
and perjury as its weapon. And the local jurisdictions of the
states and territories (other than Alaska) embracing mineral
lands of the public domain have long ago responded to the neces-
sities of the case and exercised the regulative power delegated to
them by the federal statute. As Lindley states, miners' district
organizations and regulations prescribed by them are, for the
most part, things of the past, and were better abolished alto-
gether.15 But out of fourteen states and territories( other than
Alaska) in which the federal mining law finds any considerable
application, twelve have by their statutes required the posting of
notices on located claims and prescribed the contents of such
notices, have specified the character and markings of the monu-
ments to be set, and have fixed a limit to the time following dis-
covery for completing acts of location; ten of them prescribe an
amount of annual assessment work going beyond the minimum
federal requirement, and regulate its character; and all fourteen
require the recording of location notices in local registration
offices. 16
In contrast with this ample supplementary regulation, in our
other western mining commonwealths, of the conditions upon
which the miner's possessory estate may vest, what have we in
Alaska?
Lindley says 17 that the lack of any local legislature for the
district of Alaska, taken with the unique manner of occurrence of
some of its gold deposits, has resulted in the formation of local
codes of mining regulations, some of them quite elaborate. It is to
be regretted that this statement is not borne out by the facts in
some of the most important mining camps, and that in some, where
local regulations were adopted, they have long since so fallen
into disuse as to be now quite lost sight of--disregarded by and
even unknown to the great bulk of the mining community. This
of course deprives those early district regulations of the force of
15 1 Lindley, § 76.
16 1 Lindley, Sect. 25o. The state and territorial statutes presenting these
and other details are set forth in the Appendix, ii Lindley, pp. 1792-1938.
17 1 Lindley, § 76.
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customary law, 18 if indeed they ever acquired such force. For
example, the miners' regulations of the Cape Nome district,
adopted on October 15, i898, which that author mentions, 19 and
which in i9oi were held by the district court to be void as re-
gards their attempt to limit the shape and proportions of placer
claims,20 are now no longer treated as in force at all; and it is
safe to say that nine-tenths of the present mining population of
that district is unaware of their existence. And at Council the
recorder was unable to find for me, in i9o4, any record of a
local code for that rich district.
There is, then, in Alaska virtually no regulation by miners'
district organizations of those details of the acquisition of a
miners' possessory estate which the federal law has left, every-
where, to local authority. There remains, as a source of such
regulation, only general legislation applicable throughout Alaska.
But the Congress of the United States retains in its own hands,
coupled with its functions as lawgiver on matters of national
concern, the functions of a local legislature for Alaska_2 ' denying
to the 87,00022 inhabitants of the district all legislative autonomy
whatever. There is much to be said in justification of this with-
holding of full territorial organization, so long as the political
conditions of the district remain in their present chaotic state.
But meanwhile, what has Congress done in its capacity of
Alaska's local legislature, as regards this matter of detailed regu-
lation of the locating and maintaining of unpatented mining
claims? Congress did indeed enact in 1899 a criminal code 23
and in igoo a civil code 24 for Alaska, which were carefully
framed and are in general adequate to the local needs. But
there is not a line of enactment requiring that a notice of location
of a mining claim be posted upon it, or regulating the character
18 Harvey v. Ryan (1872), 42 Cal. 626, 628. Jupiter M. Co. v. Bodie
Con. M. Co. (88I), 7 Saw. 96, io6; ii Fed. 666, 674.
' i Lindley, § 448a (P. 796).
20 Price v. McIntosh, i Alaska, 286, 297.
21American Ins. Co. v. Canter (1828), 1 Pet. 5x, 542; 7 L. Ed. 242,
255. First Natl. Bank v. County of Yankton (188o), 101 U. S. 129, 133;
25 L. Ed. IO46, 1047. Mormon Church v. United States (i89o), 136 U. S.
1, 43; 34 L. Ed. 478, 491.
22Population in i9o6, according to minority report from house
judiciary committee on the bill to provide an additional judge for Alaska.
(6oth Cong., ist Sess., H. R. Report No. 1633.)
23 Act of March 3, i8g9. Ch. 429; 30 Stat. L., p. 1253.
2"Act of June 6, Igoo, Ch. 786; 31 Stat. L., P. 321.
PLACER MINING LAW IN ALASKA
or markings of the monuments to be set, or limiting the time after
a discovery for completing a location based on it; and only the
following provision touching the recording of location notices:
"The respective recorders shall . . . record. .... -
Tenth. Notices of mining location and declaratory statements;
Provided, notices of location of mining claims shall be filed for
record within ninety days from the date of the discovery of the
claim described in the notice, and all instruments shall be re-
corded in the recording district in which the property or subject
matter affected by the instrument is situated," etc.2"
The district court for the third division of Alaska appears to
regard this provision as mandatory, and its non-observance as
entailing a forfeiture ;26 following in this the views of the Mon-
tana and Nevf'da courts.27  The district court for the second
division, on the contrary, holds the statute directory, its dis-
regard carrying no penalty since none is expressed ;28 which is
the settled doctrine in California and Arizona, 20 as well as the
more sound in principle.
The result of this incompleteness of the written law of Alaska
on the subject is that unscrupulous persons can and do set up
claims to a valid and prior location of mineral land which, in the
bands and through the efforts of others, has developed evidence
of substantial value. The way in which such claims are set up,
and often successfully maintained, may be best illustrated by a
concrete example:
B, who in 19o7 had purchased the right of the locator in a
tundra claim staked in 19o6, and who has developed a rich "pay-
streak" and is working on a large scale, is sued in ejectment by
A, who claims to have made in 1905 a location embracing all
that part of B's claim in which the paystreak lies, based on a dis-
25 Act of June 6, i9oo, Ch. 786, Tit. I., § I5; 31 Stat. L., p. 327.
26 Charlton v. Kelly (1905), 2 Alaska, 532, 539. See Butler v. Good-
enough M. Co. (ipoi), i Id. 246, 253, and Redden v. Harlan (I95), 2 Id.
402, 404.
27King v. Edwards (i87o), I Mont. 235, 241. Purdum v. Laddin
(1899), 23 Id. 387, 389; 59 Pac. 153, I54. Sisson v. Sommers (i8p9), 24
Nev. 379, 387; 55 Pac. 829, 83o; 77 Am. St. R. 815, 818.
2 In several recent cases, as yet unreported.
29 McGarrity v. Byington (i859), 12 Cal. 426, 43r. English v. Johnson
(i86o), 17 Id. io8, II7; 76 Am. D. 574, 577. Bell v. Bed Rock T. & M.
Co. (i868), 36 Id. 214, 219. Jupiter M. Co. v. Bodie Con. M. Co. (i88I),
7 Saw. 96, I.17; ii Fed. 666, 68o. Rush v. French (1874), I Ariz. 99, 146;
25 Pac. 816, 830. Johnson v. McLaughlin (1884), I Ariz. 493, 501; 4 Pac.
130. 132.
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covery of gold made in A's presence in 1903 (by a locator who
in 19o4 allowed his claim to lapse by non-performance of the
assessment work), which discovery A says that he adopted3
when making his own location. A testifies that he set stakes at
the four corners of his claim, marking them with its name and
the respective corner designations; that he had no paper or blank
notices with him, but went to town to obtain some, where he was
told by his lawyer that so long as his stakes were properly marked
a posted notice was not essential ;31 and that he therefore did not
journey back to the claim, but made out a notice and filed it for
record. The suit is brought and tried during 19o8, and the jury,
viewing the premises, find only one stake anywhere near a corner
of what A points out as the ground located by him-and that one,
a crooked piece of willow brush, blazed on one side but so
weathered that its markings are undecipherable. The recorded
notice offered in evidence by A contains a description tied to no
landmarks nor neighboring claims, and hence so indefinite and
ambulatory that the notice is just as referable to any-one of a
hundred other claims as to the one in question; but its indefinite-
ness is not fatal, since there is no statute requiring either the
posting or the recording of any notice at all.
Such are the local conditions, in a large part of the Seward
Peninsula at least, that a case based on the evidence here sup-
posed is perfectly consistent with either the truthfulness or the
absolute falsity of A's claimr A featureless plain or bench, al-
most flat, and bare of timber except, in places, a gnarled and
stunted willow brush; claim-stakes standing or fallen on every
hand-not a foot of the country within miles of Nome or Council,
for instance, but has ben staked and restaked from three to ten
times; roving prospectors crossing in every direction on their way
to ground beyond, and prone as they pass by to pull up the willow
stakes either for use (after whittling off the markings) in staking
new claims of their own or, it may be, to eke out a campfire (this
notwithstanding a penal statute against disturbance of claim cor-
ners) ; a spring break-up often involving such violence to the
3
.lupiter M. Co. v. Bodie Con. M. Co. (i8Sx), 1i Fed. (Cal.) 666.
Hayes v. Lavignino (1898,) 17 Utah, 185; 53 Pac. 1029. Nevada Sierra Oil
Co. v. Home Oil Co. (1899), 98 Fed. (Cal.) 673. Copper Globe M. Co. v.
Allman (igoI), 64 Pac. (Utah) o1g.
31 Haws v. Victoria Copper Co. (1895), 16o U. S. 303; 40 L. Ed. 436,
441. Book v. Justice M. Co. (1893), 58 Fed. lo6, 115.
PLACER MINING LAW IN ALASKA
surface by ice-movements and flood that many stakes are swept
away and that it is impossible to determine afterwards, from any
surviving indications, whether or not a trench or pit alleged to
have been dug the preceding season by way of assessment work
involved the required amount of labor, or was even dug at all;
and a large floating population, here to-day and gone to-morrow,
so that an honest claimant's own testimony may well have to go
uncorroborated or, on the other hand, a plaintiff seeking to win
by his perjury may plausibly allege that he does not know what
has become of a man who, he says, was with him when he staked
his claim, or when he made his discovery, or when he performed
bis assessment work for such and such a year. Add to these ele-
ments a strong motive on the part of the one in possession, as
soon as he has found his claim to contain rich pay, to destroy the
stakes and other evidences of any location apparently conflicting
with and prior to his own, and you have a field where to litigate
a mining claim is, in many instances, merely to gamble on the
well-known capriciousness of the average jury.
It has become proverbial in Alaska that the finding of rich
"pay" is the signal for an adverse claim to the ground, sometimes
two or three of them, which had never been heard of while its
value was still conjectural. And I have myself been professionally
connected with a suit over a claim worth more than a quarter of
a million dollars, in which the only physical evidence
of the plaintiff's ever having staked the ground was a recorded
notice; yet the case was tried three times, each trial lasting a
full week or longer and entailing upon the two parties a total
expense of more than fifteen thousand dollars, and each trial re-
sulting in a disagreement of the jury, and finally it was com-
promised by the plaintiff's acceptance of fifty thousand dollars in
settlement; and I have never been clear in my -own mind as to
whether my client or the adverse party was the one justly
entitled.
And it would be so easy to eliminate the chief causes of all this
uncertainty of titles (even without a recasting of the federal law
on the lines of the admirable Mexican mining code), and to lift
the curse of needless litigation from Alaska's boundless mineral
wealth, by the enactdilent of legislation local to that region, cor-
responding to that which has long been on the statute books of
all the mining states and territories, supplementing the basic re-
quirements of Section 2324 of the United States Revised Statutes.
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It is not that Alaskans regard the federal mining law, which has
served our western commonwealths for forty years, as unsuited
to their own needs; but that Congress fails to appreciate the fact
that the general law, as it stands, is but one component of an
adequate system of regulation, and that its complement, which
Congress alone has the power to enact as law local to Alaska, is
wholly lacking.
An exception to this statement should be noted, however, in
respect of the required proof of performance of assessment
work; Congress having passed an act in 19o7, which requires a
particularity of such proof that goes far toward putting an end
to sham and perjury in that regard.32
Taking the mining law of Alaska as we find it, however, let
us examine some of the questions which its application to placer
ground gives rise to.
How far does the rule that a trespass can initiate no right in
the public lands, as against one in actual possession, go to prevent
an adverse location which will give the locator a standing to
challenge the validity of a previous alleged location? That rule
is a settled one where there is possessio pedis and the trespass is
forcible ;33 but where the possession is constructive,-a mere legal
presumption arising from recent actual physical occupancy,-
or where, though the possession is actual, the technical tres-
passer's entry is made peaceably and is unresisted, a discovery
and staking following upon such entry may constitute a mining
location valid as against an actual occupant without right of
possession."4 This, of course, is the law everywhere.
But "blanket locations" are common in Alaska. A man locates,
in the names of himself and seven others, an association claim of
one hundred and sixty acres. Such a claim, extending half a
mile in each dimension, may include within its boundaries half
a dozen single claims of twenty acres each, previously staked, as
32 Act of March 2, 19o7, Ch. 2559; 34 Stat. L., p. 1243.
33Atherton v. Fowler (1878), 96 U. S. 513; 24 L. Ed. 782. Eilers v.
Boatman, 3 Utah, 159; 2 Pac. 66. S. C., III U. S. 356; 28 L. Ed. 454.
McIntosh v. Price (1903), 121 Fed. (C. C. A.) 716, 719. Bulette v. Dodge
(19o), 2 Alaska, 427, 431.
34 I Lindley, Sects. 217, 218. Smith v. Doe (i86o), I5 Cal. IOI, IO5.
Brandt v. Wheaton (1877), 52 Cal. 43o. Belk v. Meagher (I88I), IO4 U.
S. 279; 26 L. Ed. 735, 738. Wilson v. Triumph C. M. Co. (1899), I9 Utah,
66; 56 Pac. 300; 75 Am. St. R. 718. Thallmann v. Thomas (Igor), III
Fed. 277, 279 (C. C. A., 8th Cir.).
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well as several small fractions left "open" (that is, not located
upon), interspersed among them; yet the corner and side line
stakes of the association claim may lie wholly outside the single
claims, so that no visible trespass was committed in setting them.
But if one of the prior locators, over whose claim a blanket is
thus thrown, is in actual possession of it, and objects to the new-
comer's staking ground which includes his own, does not the
staking of the blanket claim constitute a trespass upon the
objector's ground, for the purposes of the rule that a trespass can
initiate no rights, equally as if the later locator walked across the
other's ground in setting his stakes, instead of around it? Much
may be said in support of the view that this is virtually a tres-
pass, making the attempted group location void as against in-
cluded claims in actual possession under color of right. The
Alaska courts have not to my knowledge gone so far as this,
however. But it has been wisely held, in the second division, that
the blanket location must be supported, as to each detached parcel
that it embraces, by a separate discovery thereon, whether those
parcels are previously unstaked fractions lying between the claims
adversely held, or are such claims themselves.
3 5
The differing limitations of lode and placer claims in point of
size--of lode claims, to a maximum length of 1,5oo feet and
width of 6oo feet, and of placer claims to a maximum area of
twenty acres for a single locator-are familiar to all. They are
here mentioned only as introductory to the subject of restrictions
upon the dimensions and shape of placer claims located upon un-
surveyed lands. As to these, there has been some difference of
view, and of land office practice. In an old land office case, a
placer claim in California laid out so as to extend for 12,00o
feet along a stream bed in a narrow canyon, yet comprising an
area of only twenty acres, was approved and patented. Recently,
in a case from Alaska, the general land office rejected an applica-
tion for a patent of a placer, claim in the vicinity of Nome, upon
the ground that it was irregular in shape and did not conform to
meridian lines, nor to the plan of any system of general public
surveys which may hereafter be undertaken in that region. (There
have been no public land surveys in Alaska according to the
government's general.system, but only special surveys of individ-
ual claims in connection with applications for mining patents, and
a few for homesteads.) On appeal to the Secretary of the In-
35 Recent case, not yet reported.
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terior, however, that decision has been reversed, quite recently;
the Secretary laying it down as a rule for the future guidance of
the land office, in passing on applications for patents, that a placer
claim of any shape and with its boundary lines running in any
directions will be approved, provided it is of compact form and
can be included within a square forty-acre tract, or within an
eight acre parallelogram if located by three or four persons,
within three forties if by five or six, or within four forties if by
seven or eight persons; that, however, no inordinately long and
narrow claim can be patented; but that no locator will be com-
pelled to include non-placer ground unless he so desires.""
This ruling, of course, only establishes a modified restriction
upon the dimensions and shape of placer claims which will be
passed to patent. As to unpatented holdings, the rule laid down
in i9o1 by the district court for the second division of Alaska,
still obtains in that district; namely, that placer claims may be
located without regard to the general system of public surveys,
and need not conform thereto in any particular.3 7  This is an
extremely liberal construction of the statute,38 a complete dis-
regard of it, indeed; but if "judge-made law" is ever justifiable,
it would seem to be so in this matter, for the mountain spurs,
gulches, winding streams and buried beach deposits of Alaska
are so various in position and irregular in trend and outline, that
the rectangular and meridional system of land surveys, which was
so admirably adapted to our prairie west, is utterly unsuited to
that land-unless, perhaps, to such scattered areas as are agricul-
tural in character; and a general survey, when undertaken, may
be on a radically different basis. Meanwhile, even if the plan of
the future general survey could be forecast, it would paralyze
both prospecting and development if every claim must needs be
laid out according to fixed proportions and compass bearings.39
In this connection it should be noted that in 19ol the then
district judge for the third division of Alaska, sitting temporarily
in the second division, held that where a claim had been located
on a winding creek as "commencing at the upper or north end
stake of Claim No. 14, thence running along the bed of the creek
1,5oo feet, then 300 feet east and west from the center stake,"
36 Re Snow Flake Fraction Placer (igo8), 37 L. D. 250, 258.
37 Price v. McIntosh, i Alaska, 286, 295.
38 R. S. § 2331.
s" See i Lindley, § 448.
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it must be taken not as following the sinuosities of the creek, not-
withstanding the language used, but as a parallelogram whose
center line runs straight from the center stake at one end to that
at the other.41 In view of this decision, it would seem that a
locator desiring to take in the whole bed of a crooked stream,
must set side-line stakes at intervals along its course, and should
frame the description in his location notice accordingly.
Next, as to the effect of a discovety subsequent to the act of
location: The law is settled that the order of succession of these
two acts is immaterial, no adverse rights having intervened.4"
But when discovery follows location, does it relate back to the
time of location? Clearly it cannot, as against an intervening
locator's rights; but does it so relate back for the purpose of per-
fecting the possessory right of one who was competent to acquire
such a right when he staked the claim, but had become incapa-
citated in the interval? The district court for the second division
of the district of Alaska, has recently held that it does not; 42
and the cause is now pending on appeals before the circuit court
of appeals for the ninth circuit, heard but not yet decided. The
pertinent facts were these:
In i9o2, one Whittren located the claim, and made a discovery
within its lines, near its northwest corner. In November, i9o3,
on surveying the claim he ascertained that he had staked an area
in excess of twenty acres, whereupon he drew in the northwest
corner, thus excluding from the corrected area the site of his
original discovery ;43 and in the following month he made a new
discovery within the area retained. But in the interval preceding
his restaking and new discovery, he had become a United States
deputy mineral surveyor, and at that time still held the office.
One who in 19o4 located a claim conflicting with his brought
ejectment, and the district court held, following the Utah 44 and
rejecting the Nevada 45 precedent, that as a deputy mineral
surveyor he was disqualified, by the provisions of R. S. Sec. 452,
40 Steen v. Wild Goose M. Co. (igoI), i Alaska, 255, 263.
4"Heman v. Griffith (igoi), i Alaska, 264. Redden v. Harlan (x9o5),
2 Id. 4o2. Bulette v. Dodge (i9o5), 2 Id. 427. Charlton v. Kelly (igo5),
2 Id. 532.
4 2 Hammer v. Waskey, decided in i9o7; not yet reported. See Redden
v. Harlan (I9o5), 2 Alaska, 402, 406.
43 See Gwillim v. Donnellan (I885), 115 U. S. 45, 50.44 Lavignsno v. Uhlig, 7I Pac. (Utah) io46.
4 5Hand v. Cook, 92 Pac. (Nev.) 3.
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from acquiring any interest in the public domain-a ruling which
would seem to be fully sustained by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court, rendered since then, in Prosser v. Finn."8
The district court thereupon directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. To reach this result, the court must necessarilv have
held-in view of the established rules that a location inadver-
tently made in excess of the permitted maximum area is void only
as to the excess, 47 and that the locator may select for himself the
portion to be retained,' 8-that a new discovery within the re-
tained area was requisite, and that such a discovery, made at a
time when the locator stood disqualified from acquiring a mining
claim, could not relate back to the time of the original location,
when he was not disqualified.
An important difference between the legal rules applied to lode
and to placer mining is found in the classification, as between
realty and personalty, of mineral-bearing material, or "pay dirt,"
when removed from its place in nature but not yet "sluiced" to
separate and save the gold which it contains. This is nr'atter for
special consideration with reference to the deep mining of the
buried ancient beach deposits of the Nome region. The so-called
"third beach line," for example, is what was in some far-re-
moved geologic period the actual beach against which flowed the
tides and beat the storms of Bering Sea. The counteraction of
tide and surf against the gold brought by stream-flow and gravi-
tation to the sea's edge, effected a rich concentration of the metal
in the beach gravel, underlaid at the depth of a few feet by bed-
rock. A later upheaval of the land mass lifted this bedrock, with
the gold-charged beach gravel overlying it undisturbed, to an
elevation of some seventy feet above the present level of the sea.
Ages of erosion of the farther uplands followed, burying bedrock
and gravel under an alluvial deposit averaging near one hundred
feet in depth. And now comes the Nome miner, sinks a shaft
through this alluvium to bedrock, finds the gravel rich in gold,
thaws it, shovels it into buckets, hoists it to the surface, and all
through the winter, while the face of the country is icebound, he
is accumulating beside the mouth of his shaft a "dump" of this
material. In the spring, when the snows melt and the streams
46 208 U. S. 67 (i9o8).
47 See Pratt v. United Alaska M. Co. (i9oo), i Alaska, 95, and cases
cited in Syl. 3. Richmond v. Rose (885), 114 U. S. 576.
48 McIntosh v. Price (19o3), 121 Fed. (C. C. A.) 716.
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begin to run, he sets up his sluice boxes, brings a "sluice head" of
water from the nearest stream, and washes out his gold dust-
from forty to sixty dollars' worth from every cubic yard of the
gravel that he hoisted to the surface.
Is this dump of gold-bearing material, before it goes through
the sluice boxes and yields up its gold, real estate or personal
property? The question has a variety of bearings which render it
important; as, upon title, remedy, measure of damages.
It is settled that an unpatented mining claim is real estate,
conveyable and descendible as such, notwithstanding the govern-
ment still holds the paramount title. Again, it is settled that
when quartz or other mineral-bearing "rock in place" has been
severed by the miner from its situs in natura and placed else-
where, it has thus become converted from real into personal
property.49 This is because the ore -is itself a marketable product,
often sold by the ton (upon assay) before extraction of the
gold, often shipped, whether by the miner or by a purchaser from
him, to distant smelters where the gold is to be separated. Of
course, too, the gold dust in the placer dump, when once separated
and saved by "sluicing the dump," is personal property. But take
the unwashed dump as it stands, with the particles of gold widely
scattered throughout its mass. It is of no value to load and ship
away-the expense would be too great. It is of no value where it
stands, except to extract the gold from it right there. The
material has been shifted in position, it is true, from the deep-
buried bedrock to the surface of the claim. But it was not "rock
in place" where it lay-not locatable as a lode, according to the
better opinion ;.0 although there is one case holding that a mass
of gravel, boulders and broken rock, buried deep within the origi-
nal unbroken mass of the mouptain, is "in place" and locatable as
a lode, no matter where originally formed or how deposited."1
This placer gold has not been "mined ;" merely one step toward
mining it has been taken-the removing of the material through-
out which the gold is scattered to the surface of the ground, where
the gold can more conveniently be extracted from it. Every rain
storm washes some of the gold out of the edges of the dump into
the undisturbed soil of the natural surface. If the dump is never
49 Forbes v. Gracey (1877), 94 U. S. 762; 24 L. Ed. 313, 314.
50 Gregory v. Pershbacher, 73 Cal. iog.
14 Jones v. Prospect Mt. Tunnel Co., .3, Pac. (Nev.) 642.
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sluiced, a few seasons will weather it down and make it one with
the ground on which it rests.
In view of these considerations, the district court for the
second division of Alaska held, in 19o7, that a dump of placer
material is still part of the real estate if resting on the surface of
the claim from which it was dug out, and that it remains one in
title with the claim itself; so that if taken out by a trespasser,
or by one against whom a suit in ejectment and for damages has
prevailed, the judgment for the plaintiff does not vest the defend-
ant with title to the dump, 'as might be the case were it personal
property."2
It is worth while to point out, in conclusion, that although the
miner's possessory title to an unpatented claim (whether placer
or lode) is an interest in real estate, and descendible as such, in
Alaska its transfer does not require a joinder of the miner's wife
in the deed; but this rule does not have to find its basis in any
peculiarity of the estate, but rests on the fact that, by the civil
code of Alaska, a widow is dowable not of whatever-lands her
husband was seized of during coverture, but only of those where-
of he died seized.53 The United States Supreme Court has held,
however, that the right of dower does not attach to an unpatented
mining claim, even under the wording of statutes of dower usual
in other jurisdictions. The use of the word "seized" in those
statutes is what reconciles this decision with the now firmly
established doctrine that the possessory right is, notwithstanding
the "paramount title of the United States," a vested and descend-
ible estate in real property.
Thomas R. Shepard.
52Johnston v. Gibson (No. 1716); on motion for injunction. The
cause was settled before final decree, and is not reported.
" Civil Code of Alaska, Tit. III, Ch. 7, §36. See Bechtol v.
Bechtol (19o5), 2 Alaska, 397, 399.
54 Black v. Elkhorn M. Co., 163 U. S. 445; 41 L. Ed. 221.
